

Message Text

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R 161950Z JAN 78
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4295
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
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AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 00911

USEEC

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: UNCTAD, EAID, MOPS, XW, XI
SUBJECT: CHEYSSON'S VIEWS ON COMMON FUND, HORN OF
AFRICA AND WESTERN SAHARA

REF: (A) 77 STATE 300163, (B) ADDIS 6913
(C) ADDIS 0080, (D) STATE 4409

1. SUMMARY: CLAUDE CHEYSSON, EUROPEAN COMMISSIONER FOR
DEVELOPMENT, MET WITH AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANIED BY BILLO
FOR WELL OVER ONE HOUR JANUARY 13. CONVERSATION, AFTER
INITIAL PHASE IN WHICH CHEYSSON REITERATED COMMISSION'S
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APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT'S HISTORIC VISIT AND HIS OWN
DEEP REGRET THAT HE HAD BEEN UNAVOIDABLY DETAINED IN
AFRICA, CONCENTRATED ON THREE SUBJECTS: COMMON FUND,
HORN OF AFRICA, AND PROBLEMS IN NORTHWEST AFRICA. END
SUMMARY.

2. COMMON FUND: IN RESPONSE AMBASSADOR'S OUTLINE OF

PRESIDENT'S DISCUSSION WITH JENKINS OF NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES, CHEYSSON EXPOUNDED AT LENGTH HIS VIEWS OF SITUATION AMONG G-77 COUNTRIES AND PROPOSED NEW APPROACH TO COMMON FUND NEGOTIATIONS. HE PREFACED HIS REMARKS BY SAYING THAT HE HAD FOUND IN HIS OCTOBER VISIT TO THE UNGA THAT THE G-77 IS GENERALLY LESS COHESIVE AND IS SHOWING EVIDENCE OF MAJOR INTERNAL DISSENSION. ALL THEY HAVE LEFT IS FRAGILE POLITICAL LOYALTY TO THE MANILA DECLARATION. HE TRACED THE HISTORY OF THE NORTH/SOUTH CONFRONTATION BEGINNING IN 1973 WITH THE OIL EMBARGO, THROUGH THE PERIOD OF THE 6TH AND 7TH UNGA SPECIAL SESSIONS, TO THE SUSPENSION OF COMMON FUND NEGOTIATIONS. REFLECTING THAT THE EARLY PERIOD WERE HEADY DAYS FOR THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, HE CONTRASTED THAT PERIOD WITH THE PAST TWO YEARS, IN WHICH POOR AND WEAK MEMBERS OF THE G-77 HAVE REALIZED THAT THE OIL WEAPON HAS BEEN BOTH A MAJOR HINDRANCE AND A HELP TO THEM. IN CHEYSSON'S OPINION, IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND ALGERIA MADE A TACTICAL BLUNDER AT PARIS IN REFUSING TO PERMIT CREATION OF A GROUP TO DISCUSS OIL PROBLEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE, THUS PROVIDING A PRECEDENT AND/OR JUSTIFICATION FOR ANY G-77 MEMBER TO PURSUE HIS OWN NARROW INTERESTS. EVEN THOUGH G-77 MUST PERFORCE CONTINUE TO DEFEND THE MANILA DECLARATION AS A SACRED TEXT FROM THE EARLIER PERIOD, MANY OF ITS LEADERS HAVE NOW CONCLUDED THAT PROGRESS ON MAJOR NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES ON

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THE BASIS OF CONFRONTATION WITH THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES IS NOT FEASIBLE. IN SHORT, THE RANGE OF INTERESTS WITHIN G-77 IS TOO GREAT FOR SUCH A POLICY TO WORK.

3. WHILE CHEYSSON THOUGHT THE GROUP B COUNTRIES ERRED IN PRESENTING AN INADEQUATE COMMON FUND POSITION IN NOVEMBER, THE G-77 BEHAVIOR WAS WORSE IN DEMONSTRATING NO INCLINATION TO COMPROMISE--OR EVEN TO NEGOTIATE. BUT CONTRARY TO EARLIER YEARS, THE G-77 UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE CAME FROM WEAKNESS, NOT STRENGTH. WE SHOULD NOT RESUME ON THIS BASIS; RATHER TO RESOLVE THE IMPASSE, CHEYSSON RECOMMENDED A "CLASSIC" DIPLOMATIC MANEUVER BY THE MAJOR INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES VIS-A-VIS SELECTED LEADERS OF THE G-77. HE SAID THAT COORDINATED, CONCURRENT BILATERAL CONTACTS BY A FEW DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (E.G., U.S., FRANCE, FRG, A NORDIC COUNTRY AND POSSIBLY JAPAN) WITH 8 TO 12 OF MOST IMPORTANT G-77 GOVERNMENTS MIGHT HELP ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR COMPROMISE, ENABLING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE COMMON FUND TO PROCEED THIS SPRING. BARRING SUCCESS HERE, CHEYSSON WAS ADAMANT THAT IN FORTHCOMING UNCTAD MEETINGS IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE ON GROUP B'S PART TO DEPART FROM ITS PRESENT

POSITION ON THE COMMON FUND, APART FROM MINOR TACTICAL CHANGES, SINCE THIS WOULD ONLY BETRAY WEAKNESS ON OUR PART AND ACCOMPLISH NOTHING.

4. AMBASSADOR HINTON COMMENTED THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS ATTRACTED TO THE IDEA OF DIPLOMATIC PROBES AND WOULD DISCUSS IT WITH DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOSWORTH WHO WOULD BE VISITING THE COMMISSION NEXT WEEK FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THIS ISSUE. UNFORTUNATELY, CHEYSSON WILL AGAIN BE OUT OF TOWN.

5. THE AMBASSADOR THEN TURNED THE DISCUSSION TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. HE REVIEWED THE BACKGROUND TO THE ETHIOPIAN PROBLEM AS PRESENTED IN

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REFTELS A AND B, TOUCHED ON TERROR IN ADDIS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND DESCRIBED CURRENT U.S. POLICY REGARDING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA, AS WELL AS THE DANGERS WE SEE IN MAJOR POWER INTERVENTION IN AFRICAN DISPUTES AND THE NEED FOR RESPECT

FOR EXISTING BOUNDARIES. AFTER REMARKING THAT HE HAD NOT BEFORE FULLY APPRECIATED THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SOVIET AIRLIFT AND OF THE SOVIET-CUBAN INTERVENTION, CHEYSSON REVIEWED AT LENGTH HIS CONTACTS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS WITH VARIOUS CONCERNED AFRICAN LEADERS. HE DESCRIBED, FOR INSTANCE, HIS RECENT DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT BONGO OF GABON, CURRENTLY PRESIDENT OF THE

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OAU AND AN ULTRA ANTI-COMMUNIST, WHO, NEVERTHELESS, SAID THAT SIAD BARRE'S POLICY IN THE HORN WAS THE MAJOR SOURCE OF INSTABILITY IN THE AREA. GIVEN SOMALIA'S ENCROACHMENT ON ETHIOPIA'S TRADITIONAL BORDERS, BONGO TOLD CHEYSSON THAT THE OAU COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY PLAY A MEDIATING ROLE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA. THE PRINCIPLE OF INVIOABILITY OF PRESENT BOUNDARIES WAS PARAMOUNT IN AFRICA, OTHERWISE CHAOS WOULD RESULT. BONGO HIMSELF HAD AN INTEREST IN UNITING THE BATEKE PEOPLES BUT HAD COMPLETELY REFRAINED FROM DOING ANYTHING ABOUT IT SINCE WERE THE PRINCIPLE BREACHED, WAR WOULD SPREAD THROUGHOUT AFRICA. THEN CHEYSSON WENT ON TO RECOUNT, IN PART, A "SIX HOUR" CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH SIAD BARRE LAST YEAR IN WHICH HE ASKED:IF THE SOMALI LEADER DID INDEED PERCEIVE A MORAL AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO HIS PEOPLES, "WHY DIDN'T HE ATTACK DJIBOUTI, AND ERITREA AS WELL AS ETHIOPIA?" BARRE ALLEGEDLY REACTED WITH SOME DIFFICULTY, EXPLAINING TO CHEYSSON THAT IN THE LATTER TWO AREAS ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS WERE IN CONTROL, WHEREAS IN ETHIOPIA THE EMPIRE HAD COLLAPSED. IN THIS LATTER CASE, BARRE REPORTEDLY FELT HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO RESPOND TO HIS "SACRED DUTY" TO ASSIST THE SOMALI PEOPLES. CHEYSSON SAID HE HAD REMINDED BARRE OF THE PARALLEL OF THE TWO GERMANIES, SAYING THAT BARRE EVENTUALLY WOULD HAVE TO DESIST IN HIS PRESENT CAMPAIGN AND RESIGN HIMSELF MERELY TO AN ABSTRACT "YEARNING" FOR REUNIFICATION OF THE SOMALIAN PEOPLES. WITH THE MILITARY SITUATION WORSENING, SIAD BARRE WOULD COME TO SEE HE HAD MADE A MISTAKE AND WOULD SETTLE. WHILE HE DISLIKED BEING CRITICAL, THE U.S. INSTIGATED IRANIAN STATEMENT WAS NOT THE WAY TO GET A NEGOTIATION GOING.

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6. CONCERNING THE ETHIOPIAN SITUATION ITSELF, CHEYSSON ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WAS TERRORISM AND CIVIL STRIFE IN

THE COUNTRY, BUT, IN HISTORICAL TERMS, HE VIEWED THE ETHIOPIAN SITUATION AS COMPARABLE TO THAT OF FRANCE IN 1791. WITH THE DOWNFALL OF THE OLD REGIME, A RADICAL AND COMPREHENSIVE REORGANIZATION OF LAND TENURE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, AS WELL AS IN THE CITIES, HAD TAKEN PLACE. THIS COULD ONLY LEAD TO VIOLENCE AND DISREGARD OF HUMAN RIGHTS. CHEYSSON BELIEVED THAT GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE REVOLUTION , AS WITH FRANCE IN THE 18TH CENTURY, WE WOULD HAVE TO PUT UP WITH A "PERIOD OF ADJUSTMENT" WHICH MIGHT LAST A FEW YEARS. MENGISTU AND OTHERS WOULD DOUBTLESS BE KILLED BEFORE STABILITY RETURNED. GIVEN HISTORICAL FORCES, THIS INTERIM PERIOD IS UNAVOIDABLE. IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO MAINTAIN AN ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EFFORT IN ETHIOPIA, SO THAT THE WESTERN PRESENCE IS FELT.

7. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THE HORN, CHEYSSON STATED THAT ONLY THE UNITED STATES COULD STEM SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION THERE; EUROPE DID NOT HAVE THE WEIGHT TO INFLUENCE MOSCOW. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, A SOVIET INTEREST TO BE BORNE IN MIND. DURING A CONVERSATION SEVERAL MONTHS AGO WITH MENGISTU, THE LATTER INDICATED TO CHEYSSON THAT FOR THE SOVIETS, FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE RED SEA WAS A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE. AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS SAW A SAUDI OR ARAB THREAT TO CLOSE OFF BOTH SHORES OF THE RED SEA, THEY WOULD STAY IN ETHIOPIA.

8. WHILE NOT MUCH COULD BE DONE ABOUT ETHIOPIA ITSELF, WESTERN ACTION IN AIDING SOMALIA WAS REQUIRED. THE SOVIETS HAD NOT ONLY WITHDRAWN THEIR ADVISERS FROM SOMALIA BUT HAD ALSO EXPELLED 700 STUDENTS FROM THE USSR

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AND ARRANGED FOR MORE TO BE EXPELLED FROM CUBA AND EASTERN EUROPE. SOMALIA URGENTLY NEEDED HELP. THE EC COMMITTEE OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES (JAN. 12) HAD DECIDED TO PROVIDE TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOME OF THESE SOMALI STUDENTS AND FUNDS TO HIRE EXPERTS. HE SOLICITED US SUPPORT IN THIS ENDEAVOR.

9. CHEYSSON THEN SHIFTED THE DISCUSSION TO THE SITUATION IN THE WESTERN SAHARA, COMMENTING THAT THIS AREA WORRIED HIM MORE THAN THE HORN OF AFRICA SINCE HE SAW NO SOLUTION. BOUMOUDIENNE HAS GONE TOO FAR TO DRAW BACK AND INDEED PRESIDENT DADDAH OF MAURITANIA IS A PRIME TARGET FOR CONFIDENTIAL

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ASSASSINATION BY THE POLISARIO. GIVEN THE ARRAY OF FORCES DEPLOYED AGAINST MAURITANIA, PLUS THE COUNTRY'S DIFFUSE, NOMADIC SOCIETY AND THE INHERENT DISTRUST OF THE MOROCCAN FORCES IN MAURITANIA, IF DADDAH WERE ELIMINATED, CHEYSSON'S "NIGHTMARE" WAS THAT WITHIN THREE TO FOUR WEEKS, IF NOT LESS, THE COUNTRY WOULD BE IN COMPLETE TURMOIL. AN ALGERIAN-BACKED POLISARIO TAKEOVER IN NOUAKCHOTT WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY AND THE OUTCOME OF SUCH A SITUATION, GIVEN MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN TENSION, WOULD BE INCALCULABLY DANGEROUS.

10. CHEYSSON THEN REFERRED TO ANOTHER CONVERSATION WITH OAU PRESIDENT BONGO WHICH REFLECTED THE DIFFICULTY OF ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT OF THE WESTERN SAHARA PROBLEM. BONGO WAS CHARGED WITH CONVENING A RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE AND WITH GENUINE OAU SUPPORT WANTED ARABS AS WELL AS AFRICAN ATTENDANCE. BUT SINCE HE KNOWS MOST ARAB STATES DO NOT SUPPORT HIS POLICY, BOUMOUDIENNE ASSERTSTHE POLISARIO ISSUE IS A QUESTION CONCERNING "BLACK AFRICA" WHICH BONGO AND EVERYONE ELSE KNOWS IS PATENTLY ABSURD. BONGO ALSO TOLD CHEYSSON THAT IDI AMIN

LAST MONTH AT QUADDAFFI'S INSTIGATION INVITED OAU REPRESENTATIVES TO A MEETING IN KAMPALA ON THE WESTERN SAHARA. BONGO WAS ONLY JUST ABLE TO BLOCK THIS MANEUVER.

11. GIVEN THE ACUTE PROBLEM IN MAURITANIA, CHEYSSON PROFESSED TO BE PROFOUNDLY DISTURBED BY THE UNEASY BALANCE NOW EXISTING BETWEEN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA. THE POLITICAL TENSIONS ARE ESPECIALLY WORRISOME, HE THOUGHT, GIVEN THE POTENTIAL FOR SUPER POWER INTERVENTION ON EITHER SIDE. IF THE WEST SHOULD STEP UP MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MOROCCO, FOR INSTANCE, ALGERIA
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WOULD IMMEDIATELY APPEAL TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR HELP. FORTUNATELY, EVEN THOUGH MOROCCO AND ALGERIA WERE BOTH PREDISPOSED TO GO TO WAR, SO FAR HASSAN AND BOUMOUDIENNE REALIZE THE POTENTIAL DANGERS INVOLVED WERE THEIR PROXY CONFLICT OVER MAURITANIA TO ERUPT INTO DIRECT CONFLICT.

12. THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CHEYSSON'S VIEWS AND SAID THE DEPARTMENT AND GOVERNOR GILLIGAN WELCOMED AND WOULD FACILITATE HIS WASHINGTON VISIT ABOUT FEBRUARY 21-22.

13. AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT: (A) THE DESIRED POINTS OF THE TALKS ON US POLICIES WERE MADE AND, I'M CONFIDENT, UNDERSTOOD; (B) THRUST OF CHEYSSON'S COMMENTS ARE PROBABLY OLD HAT TO MANY, BUT REPEATED HERE BECAUSE HE DOES HAVE ACCESS TO AFRICAN LEADERS AS WELL AS DEEP BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE, BECAUSE HE WANTS AND EXPECTS HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION IN WASHINGTON NEXT MONTH, AND BECAUSE CHEYSSON, AS A PRO-MITTERAND SOCIALIST, HAS AN OUTSIDE CHANCE OF BEING THE NEXT FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER. HINTON

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